Human Rights Commission Bill - report of the Human Rights Commission Bill Committee

Mr HARRISON (Hawke's Bay): I am directed by the Human Rights Commission Bill Committee to present the report of the committee on the Human Rights Commission Bill. The committee recommends that the Bill be allowed to proceed as amended. I move, That the report do lie upon the table. The attached Supplementary Order Paper refers to the proposed amendments to the Estate Duty Act, the Income Tax Act, and the Land Tax Act. The committee considered that since there had been no Governor-General's message the amendment should be referred to the Government by way of a Supplementary Order Paper. Between 23 February and 8 June the committee held 13 meetings, including 2 in Auckland and 1 in Christchurch, taking a total of 45 hours to hear 55 oral submissions. There were also 72 written submissions to be considered. In addition, the committee has met 10 times for nearly 22 hours to consider the submissions, and to deliberate on the Bill. This has resulted in 18 pages of amendments. Several people wanted a more explicit definition of the objects of the Bill, and some thought it should be more properly called the equal opportunity or anti-discrimination Bill. Those people apparently did not understand that it simply proposes the establishment of a commission to promote equality of opportunity that is consistent with certain basic human rights, and to set up a tribunal to deal with cases where the commission's attempts at conciliation have failed. The Bill, together with the Race Relations Act 1971, aims to promote tolerance on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, colour, ethnic or national origins, and religious or ethical belief. Many submissions sought to extend the list to include political belief, age, sexual orientation, and several others; but the committee thought that the list in the Bill was enough to start with and that it should be left to the commission to recommend additions to the Act. It therefore extended, in an amended clause 5, the functions of the commission to include that of receiving and inviting representations on any matter affecting human rights. The committee added some definitions to clause 2 to make clearer such expressions as “ethical belief”, “relative", and "superannuation scheme", but omitted the term "marital status". Some members considered it inappropriate and contradictory to put a de facto marriage on all fours with a legal marriage; so the term “marital status” will retain its long established meaning of being married or single. Several submissions asked for “she”, “her”, and “hers” to be added to the words “he”, him”, and “his” wherever they occurred, and for such good English words as "chairman" to become "chairperson". (Time extended.] It is an important Bill, and the extension of time will give me, as chairman of the committee, an opportunity to give a reasonable report. Under the Acts Interpretation Act the male gender embraces the female, and the committee felt that that was sufficient, and did not feel inclined to rewrite the English dictionary. Likewise, some people wanted the Bill to absorb the Race Relations Act, or to have transferred to that Act those clauses that deal with discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, national origin, and so on. However, it was felt that as the Race Relations Act is working pretty well it should be allowed to continue in the meantime. Parliament may decide in the future to consolidate the two Acts. There were some differences of opinion about the powers and requirements of the commission to issue reports and statements. The commission must report annually to the Minister of Justice, and that report must be tabled in Parliament. The committee has amended clause 5, omitted clause 74, and inserted a new clause 5a to make clearer the responsibilities of the commission for making reports, including those to the Prime Minister, and for publishing its findings. The committee received many submissions on the composition of the commission, mainly suggesting that it must contain at least one woman and a representative of a minority racial group. The committee saw dangers in this. Unless the commission is to be greatly enlarged such direct representation of all interests would be impossible. There are obvious difficulties in trying to fit into that small commission all the possible interests the Bill sets out to protect, such as men and women, married and single, European and Polynesian, Christian and humanist. The committee decided against any form of tokenism and plumped for allowing the best and most suitable people to be appointed as commissioners, regardless of sex, race, religion, origin, or colour. The committee had some difficulty with the concept of linking a new human rights commission with the office of the Ombudsman, and finally decided to allow for the fullest possible co-operation between the two by having an ombudsman appointed as a commissioner. He would bring to the new commission something of the status that the office of the Ombudsman has deservedly acquired in its 15 years of experience with comparable problems. Several submissions expressed confusion at the meaning of the various words used in clause 14 to allow for some exceptions based on common sense or practice, such as hairdressing, domestic work, separate accommodation, and public decency. The committee hopes its amendments will have removed any confusion. Many people made submissions on partnerships. Some said that all partnerships should be permitted to refuse to take on new partners for any reason, including colour, race, sex, religion, and so on, while others said that none should. In between were those who wanted the cut-off number raised as high as 25 or lowered down to two. The committee suggests leaving it at six. Sitting suspended from 5.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Hon. J. B. GORDON (Acting Leader of the House): A point of order, Mr Speaker. I seek the leave of the House for the House to continue with the reporting back of the Human Rights Commission Bill, which was interrupted by the suspension of the sitting at 5.30 p.m.

Mr SPEAKER: Is it the pleasure of the House that this course be followed? There appears to be no objection.

Mr HARRISON: I am reminded that the late Sir Winston Churchill once said, “If you want me to speak immediately, I can speak for 2 hours; if you want me to speak for 5 minutes, give me some notice.” I had some notice, and I worked on this until 1 a.m., so it will be a little shorter than it otherwise would have been. Before the adjournment I was reporting on the Human Rights Commission Bill, and the work the committee had done on it. Several people drew the committee's attention to the possibility of discrimination on unsound actuarial grounds against women taking out life insurance policies or joining superannuation schemes. The former were dealt with in clause 22(6), which the committee has amended to allow distinctions to be made when there are actuarial or statistical data upon which it is reasonable to rely relating to life expectancy, accidents, or sickness. Superannuation caused the committee even greater difficulty than life insurance policies. Most people would accept in principle the need for equality in superannuation schemes, but there is the need to protect those in existing schemes from changes that would be to their disadvantage. Changes that help some people could harm others, and there is a need for a generous period to allow for adjustments. The committee has attempted to reconcile the conflicting interests in such a way that those offering superannuation schemes will not be forced into withdrawing them or deleting some of their beneficial provisions. The committee spent a lot of time on clause 22, particularly subclause (7). We got over this by inserting a new subclause, leaving it to the commission to deal with the female jockey controversy, and satisfied ourselves by protecting the rights of single-sex clubs and of organisers of sporting events such as the men's hurdles or the ladies' golf tournament. I am sure members will be happy about that. Clause 23(5) would have permitted a landlord to refuse accommodation on the ground that a couple were living in a de facto relationship. The committee has deleted this subclause. Indeed, as I said earlier, by omitting the definition of “marital status" from clause 2 the committee has omitted all reference to “de facto" from the Bill. Some witnesses took exception to the so-called busybody clause, clause 32(1)(c), and the discretion conferred on the commission by clause 32(2) not to disclose its reasons for not proceeding with an investigation into a complaint. I am sure members and the public generally will be pleased to hear that the committee has changed the Bill to meet both these objections. In answer to questions about representation by legal counsel and about legal aid, the Department of Justice advised the committee that in the absence of provisions to the contrary a person may appear before the tribunal either in person or represented by somebody else, which would be counsel if you felt so inclined or could afford it. Similarly, legal aid would be available under section 15(1)(h) of the Legal Aid Act 1969 to an applicant who could satisfy the financial and other requirements of a grant. So both of those matters are dealt with. Part IV establishes an equal opportunities tribunal to consider and adjudicate on matters referred to it by or from a human rights commission. Some people saw the tribunal as being an unnecessary bureaucratic development; others were concerned at the constitutional implications in setting up yet another quasi-judicial body to do what the courts should be asked to do. The committee had some sympathy with these views, and in order to tie the tribunal into the court system we have proposed amendments, first, to limit the jurisdiction of the tribunal over claims for damages to that of a magistrate's court, which is at present restricted to $3,000; and, secondly, to allow appeals to the Supreme Court on matters of fact as well as law, including the right to a complete rehearing. Part V, dealing with the functions of the commission in relation to privacy, evoked a fairly favourable response, although some people felt the commission should be able to investigate individual complaints, and others expressed reservation about giving the commission a privacy function at all. This part was amended to remove the obligation of the commission to report on privacy matters referred to it by the Prime Minister, and also to exclude the Wanganui Computer Centre from its jurisdiction. It would be fair to say that most submissions were critical of Part VI, which deals with the commission's functions regarding complaints against industrial unions and professional and trade associations. Clearly this is a question involving Government policy, and the Bill has been left in the form promised by the Government's manifesto—to enable the commission to investigate matters such as the intimidation at Kinleith, which was the subject of the Davidson report in 1975. However, we agreed to an amendment allowing jurisdiction to the Commerce Commission in complaints about trade practices. Finally, I thank those members of the public who, whether as individuals or as representatives of organisations, made submissions on the Bill, thus helping the committee to bring about what I think are significant improvements to it. I wish, too, to thank the members of the committee for their patience and co-operation—and I mean that, because we had a lot of it. I also wish to thank our advisers from the Clerk's office, from the Department of Justice, and from the Parliamentary Counsel. I want, and I am sure the committee would agree wholeheartedly, to thank our committee clerk, who looked after us remarkably well. With the leave of the House, it was agreed that the speaking time allowed the member for Henderson be extended.

Hon. Dr A. M. FINLAY (Henderson): I am indebted to the House, although I am not quite sure whether I shall avail myself of the extended time. The first thing I want to take up is the point at which the member for Hawke's Bay, who was also the chairman of the committee, departed, and inform the House that one of our last actions in the committee was to pass a motion congratulating him for the amiable and efficient way in which he chaired the committee. Of course, that was coupled with thanks to the sundry people he has mentioned, whose services have been enormously valuable to us. It was a very wide-ranging committee. I do not know quite how many meetings we had. I know we had 127 submissions, and it was one of the longest committees upon which I have sat.

Mr Harrison: It sat for 454/2 hours.

Hon. Dr A. M. FINLAY: The member for Hawke's Bay tells me it was 45% hours. Well, I have no reason to doubt that, but it certainly did not seem as long as that, and perhaps that was due

Mr Harrison: Plus 22/2 hours in deliberations.

Hon. Dr A. M. FINLAY: I shall accept that. No tempers were lost. There were differences of opinion, but it was a good working committee. Having said that, I want to turn to something that is not in the Bill, and is not in any of the similar measures that are springing up all around the world. I hinted at this once or twice, but it did not get a great deal of acceptance, but I think it is a point that deserves mention because it is fundamental to an activity of this kind. There is no provision in it for what might be called the Dr Fell syndrome. You will know the couplet, Mr Speaker: "I do not like thee, Dr Fell. The reason why, I cannot tell.” What this Bill does is to direct itself—as do so many others of its ilk—against discrimination and victimisation. I sincerely hope it does that, or will do it by the time it emerges from the House, with some success, although I am bound to add that up to the moment I believe that too much is being claimed for it, and some of the rhetoric that has been attached to the contents of it by Government members has been a little overblown. The truth is that neither we nor anyone else can legislate against prejudice at its worst, when it takes the form of blind prejudice. You know the kind of thing, Mr Speaker: a couple of people are walking along a street, and one says to the other, "You see that man over there? I hate him", and his companion says, “But you don't even know him”, and the other says, “Of course, that's the reason. I don't know him. That's why I hate him.” That is what I would call blind prejudice at its worst. But there is also something less than that which I believe is innate in all of us, and that is a kind of instinctive prejudice. All of us just do not “take to" some people, and I am sure there is nothing that anyone can do to legislate that feeling out of existence. There is no way of outlawing feelings of that kind, and it would be unwise to try to do so, but I also think it is realistic to accept their existence. Although I mentioned this once or twice during the committee's deliberations, and wondered if we could include in the Bill some words that might take heed of this very human emotion-perhaps I should call it a failing I was also fearful of any real attempt to do so. What we have before us is dubbed a Human Rights Commission Bill, and it is significant that on one or two occasions, when we moved out of Wellington to hear evidence, the notice board directing people where they were to go referred to the “Human Rights Bill”, and many people have thought of it as such a Bill. Of course, it is not. There is no definition of “human rights” in the Bill; at best it might be called an equal opportunities Bill, because a tribunal of that name—an equal opportunities tribunal—is set up within the framework of it. It is true that it provides equal opportunities for some, but it excludes a provision that some of us tried to have included-some protection against political discrimination. Various areas of discrimination are outlawed, but not, much to our regret, political discrimination; so I think at best one might call it an “equal opportunities for some” Bill, and really no more than that. That prompts me to ask the question: should we have a human rights Bill, or it might be called a Bill of rights? That implies something of the nature of a written constitution, about which there have been divergent opinions that I do not want to go into at this stage. But at all events, whether or not we should have a human rights Bill or a Bill of rights, I believe this Bill should acknowledge, however faintly, the concept of human rights as such, and, at the urging of the Opposition members on the committee, the long title was altered to give such an indication. I should like to read to the House the new long title of the Bill. It is described as “An Act to establish a Human Rights Commission and to promote the advancement of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with the United Nations International Covenants on Human Rights”. I moved, and my colleagues supported me, that we might consider incorporating the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 as a schedule, not with the thought that it would be binding of course, it could never be binding without formal enactment—but as a kind of guide to the commission that it should have regard to what I think are the very profound truths contained in that declaration. There are, we found, some technical obstacles to that, because the 1948 declaration has been overtaken by subsequent covenants, which is why the phrase "international covenants” is used in the long title; it might have been misleading to have incorporated a declaration subscribed to by most members of the United Nations, and have cast eyes back on to something rather than that which has supplanted it, and which is, it appears, of much greater length than can possibly be accommodated as a schedule. I still believe it would have been valuable to tie what many people will still regard as human rights legislation—although that is not the case—to the Declaration of Human Rights or the various stages by which the United Nations has affirmed its attachment to the notion of human rights. This, of course, is particularly important at present, when President Carter is making such an issue of this in American foreign policy. I pass to another point, on which we had a great deal of evidence and, I think it is not putting it too high to say, a good deal of pressure, and that was to include the phrase "sexual orientation" as a ground for non-discrimination, along with the other characteristics such as racial origin, ethnic origin, and so on. The purpose of that was designed to meet the case of the confirmed homosexual, but that phrase "sexual orientation" in my judgment goes too far. It is a sad fact, but nevertheless a fact, that some people are sexually oriented towards others of tender years, whether they are of the same or opposite sex. I would not countenance that, and I do not believe any member of the House would countenance it or want to give respectability to a situation of that kind. I believe that the real solution to homosexual problems—and they are very real indeed—is an open and direct change of the law, which I support now as I supported it when the Bill promoted by the member for Egmont was before the last Parliament. I think that is the real way to go about meeting that problem, with all its gravity, which I acknowledge. I pass over with the barest of mention Parts V and VI of the Bill, which deal respectively with privacy and industrial relations. In my judgment they are excrescences on what has otherwise been made into a tolerable Bill, although it is still misleading in some respects. I say no more about them at this stage, but I have no doubt that during the passage of the Bill through the House there will be a great deal of discussion on those two parts. We will do our best to see that the part dealing with industrial relations is deleted, and, if the one dealing with privacy is to remain, that it is considerably altered. The Government's original plan as set out in its manifesto in fact, in both manifestoes on this occasion, including the one that has been resiled from—was to enlarge and enormously extend the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. That was totally misconceived, and betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the Ombudsman or the Ombudsmen, and it is a matter of some satisfaction, to me at least, that the Government has gradually been put on the right track-but I suppose it is too much to expect gratitude from the Government for the assistance we have given it in this direction. I turn now to one or two changes that appear in the Bill. We have added a phrase dealing with ethical belief, which I think is a step forward. We have defined it, with some difficulty, but I think it will turn out to be a workable definition, and we have made two complementary changes. One is to omit the definition of "marital status”, which originally encompassed a de facto situation; but a kind of compensating factor for that, one by which the Government members appeared to assuage their consciences, was to delete clause 23(5), which omitted a de facto relationship from a tenancy situation. Again, I believe we will hear a good deal more discussion on that, so I will say no more about it now. The provision requiring reports to be made by the commission to the Prime Minister has been significantly, and, I believe, substantially, altered for the better. As it originally stood, the right and power of the Prime Minister to call upon what I would like to think is a totally independent body to make reports to him has been substantially cut down. That is, I have no doubt, a very considerable improvement. Another matter which is possibly of less appeal to the public generally than to us—and I suppose this encompasses lawyers especially—is a drafting technique new to New Zealand, and which I think in this case is very advantageous. I cite the change in clause 14(3)(b), which appears also in the new clause: “In the case of a position such as that of attendant in a public lavatory or as a person responsible for the fitting of clothes to customers or others”. The point to which I direct attention is exemplification. I do not think it has ever happened in our legislation before, and I have the word of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel that it is an innovation that we should try to give to the courts an illustration of the kind of activity we mean by exemplifying certain areas in which it could apply. The technique has been adopted elsewhere in this kind of legislation. I think it is very apt here, because it proves extraordinarily difficult to define different kinds of occupation, different kinds of approaches, and different kinds of victimisation, and as a guide to the courts we have set out in a number of clauses exemplification of this by using the phrase "such as” and going on to say so and so, and so and so. I will wait, of course necessarily, to see just how the courts or the commission regard this. It is a development and a novelty in our way of drafting statutes, but, I think, at any rate in this field, it has a great deal to commend it. We had considerable difficulty with insurance policies. A good deal of evidence presented to us indicated discrimination between male and female in the benefits open to them when taking out life insurance policies particularly. However, on actuarial figures there seems to be some justification for this. The figures seem to demonstrate that women have a greater longevity than men, and as long as that is the case, naturally insurance companies will want to adjust their premiums and the benefits derivable from their policies in relation to the expected length of life of the individual insured. We have therefore added a clause which enables that to be done so long as it is based on actuarial or statistical data upon which it is reasonable to rely relating to life expectancy, accidents, or sickness. I have already mentioned that in clause 23(5) the tenancy provision has been dropped as a quid pro quo for the elimination of the definition of marital status. I come now to clause 25, which was the object of a good deal of representation, because, quite honestly, it was very difficult to understand. That clause has been replaced by a substitute which is sufficiently summed up by its side note, “Discrimination by subterfuge”. We considered that the Bill should have—and it now has—a provision enabling the commission to look behind the words or the appearance of some situation, and penetrate to the actuality of it. If there is some subterfuge of what is really a means of discrimination but appears not to be, the commission can go to the heart of the matter and rule on it in accordance with the reality of the situation rather than its description in words. We did face up to, with, I must confess, some hesitation and not total unanimity, the use of words that have a gender associated with them. We have added to one clause, “being a term such as carpenter, engineer, telephonist, seaman, or typist.” The word “seaman”, of course, does import masculine gender, but I would find it very hard to adopt the word "seapeople”. I do not think that “seaman” excludes the possibility that a woman may undertake a seagoing career. I do not think she would really feel denigrated if in those circumstances she was described as a seaman. I would certainly see her described as that rather than as a seaperson. We deliberately included that one word, which has that clear masculinity attached to it, as an example of the kind of thing. Though we do not want it carried so far that there would be sex stereotyping, we did throw out that slight suggestion that the mere fact that a gender was indicated with an occupation need not necessarily deter the commission from having some regard to a gender attached to an occupation which has traditionally been that of that particular gender, although this is by no means to indicate that we think it should be exclusively reserved for that gender in the future.

Hon. DAVID THOMSON (Minister of Justice): As Minister in charge of the Bill, it gives me great pleasure to see it brought back to the House after a very long and detailed study by the special select committee. I thank those who served on the committee, and join with the member for Henderson in paying tribute to the chairman, the member for Hawke's Bay, who did a magnificent job. I thank also those officers who assisted the committee—Miss Bowden of the Clerk's office, and as Minister of Justice I must mention Mrs Lowe and Miss Margaret Nixon of the Department of Justice. The Bill is of particular pleasure to me because it is within the family of legislation dealing with the rights of the individual. I relate back to the first of the Ombudsman Acts of the late Ralph Hanan in the early 1960s; then through the Race Relations Act, in which I had a part to play with the late Dan Riddiford in guiding it through the House in 1971; the matter of women's rights in the Equal Pay Act when I was Minister of Labour in 1972; and the private Bills brought down in 1973, 1974, and 1975 by the Minister of Works and Development and myself concerning the rights of women. The National Government had the issue of human rights as the first of its policy planks, so it is a pleasure to me to see that what was a good Bill when it was introduced and referred to the special committee has now come back a better Bill. Indeed, in the introduction to his evidence the retired Chief Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, said: “This is a good Bill, a very good Bill, and I think the Government is to be congratulated upon introducing it. It is a marked step forward in the social field, and could have profound beneficial effects on New Zealand society.” I am sure Sir Guy would agree with members of the committee that it is an even better Bill because of his assistance and that of others, and because of the attention that we, and the officers assisting us, have given to it. I do not propose to speak at length at this stage, but I want to deal with one or two logistic matters, if I may call them that. Members will want to know when the Bill as amended will be available in printed form. I am told that there is a good prospect of having it tomorrow, and that would be an advantage for its distribution and study before we come to the second reading, which, of course, will be after the recess. Miss Bowden of the Clerk's office has prepared a record of the principal amendments made by the committee, and it has been circulated to members and will be of considerable help to them. I have distributed a press statement that I hope will lead to a better understanding of the effects of the amended Bill. Over recent weeks some people have come to believe that the Bill is a charter for sexual disorientation, I suppose is the word for homosexuality, and that it is a charter for de facto marriages. I have had to sign many letters correcting that impression, and saying that the Human Rights Commission Bill contains no reference to homosexuals, and that certainly the Government had no intention of adding any reference to the Bill; and that we had also removed the definition of marital status, and hence the reference to de facto marriages. But that has already been adverted to. The member for Henderson said that this is not a human rights Bill, but more an equal opportunities Bill. The fact is that it is what it says it is a Human Rights Commission Bill . It sets up a commission and gives it certain functions, particularly including the promotion of human rights, and a better understanding of human rights and of the international covenants dealing with them. It does not pretend to cover the whole realm of human rights, nor to codify them. It is wise to take this first step and make quite sure—in fact it is not the first step, because our Race Relations Bill in 1971 was. Too many people stumble by taking too big a step at the beginning. It will be all the better because there is no attempt at the beginning to codify every human right. I draw attention to the amendments we have made to the Race Relations Act. It has been amended by the schedules to this Bill to align its provisions with the Human Rights Commission Bill. We do not propose to amalgamate the two. Each stands on its own. The Race Relations Conciliator's office continues on its own, although he becomes a member of the commission. I propose to have the amended Race Relations Act reprinted; that will be necessary because of the substantial changes made. As recommended to the select committee by the Race Relations Conciliator, a new provision will be included in the Race Relations Act making it unlawful for any person to incite hostility against others on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic, or national origin; and the Race Relations Conciliator may exercise his powers in relation to conciliation and civil proceedings. That is a new offence that needs to be brought to everybody's attention, because in this country we have had a great tradition of tolerance-of more than tolerance, of pride—in our multicultural society, and in each other's characteristics in that society. Here we have a statutory sanction against anybody who deliberately sets out to incite hostility against others on the ground of colour, race, ethnic, or national origin. If that goes around the world, as other information about New Zealand's attitudes on race has, to those persons to whom information has previously gone, it will do a great deal for New Zealand's international reputation. This is a very good Bill made better, and I thank those who have taken part in the discussions. We will watch with very great interest the establishment of the commission. Certainly it is my intention to get the best possible people appointed as members, among them a woman, or women. I want people representing our society as it is.

Hon. Mrs T. W. M. TIRIKATENE-SULLIVAN (Southern Maori): With the member for Henderson, I express my pleasure at having been a member of the committee, which met for almost 46 hours, in a total of 23 meetings. I was able to attend three-quarters of those meetings. I compliment the chairman and the other members; it was very pleasing and gratifying to be able to agree to disagree with Government members, and to do so with impeccable civility. I should like to see more of this civility in debates in the House. I pay a well earned compliment to Beth Bowden, who serviced the committee, for her quiet competence, thoroughness, and efficiency. Her analysis of submissions made on the various clauses was very helpful in enabling a more thorough and intelligent discussion. I also compliment Mrs Lowe and Miss Nixon of the Department of Justice, and, of course, Mr Walter Iles. Much advantage was taken of their services and expertise. I added to their labours at our final meeting when I requested that there should be a totally new explanatory note to the Bill for the benefit of the public, which would no doubt show interest and curiosity, and possibly even more enthusiasm than was shown by those who made submissions. While my request could not be met because of the pressures on our law drafting staff, at least we were able to agree that some explanation in lay language should be distributed with the amended copy of the Bill. This is immensely important so that the community can understand the extensive amendments made in the committee. Of the 127 submissions received, one-third came from women's groups, women academics, and individual women. This would be something of a record, and this significant participation by women is indicative of the new articulation shown by a group that has felt its human rights were inadequately recognised. Therefore, in passing, I can tell the Minister that the hope he expressed this evening that at least one or more women will be among the commissioners will be regarded with considerable interest by those articulate and intelligent women who appeared before the committee. As I have said, one-third of the submissions presented to the committee were made by women. I think of the Council for Equal Pay and Opportunity and the Committee on Education for Women. The National Council of Women and the Federation of University Women presented submissions, as did various groups of university women; the Association of Business and Professional Women; the Maori Women's Welfare League; the Women's Electoral Lobby from four parts of New Zealand-Rotorua, Christchurch, Nelson, and Hamilton; the National Organisation of Women, not only the head office but also the Hastings, Whangarei, and Blenheim groups; Zonta (New Zealand), Wellington and Rotorua; the Homemakers of New Zealand; and also more than half a dozen other feminist groups and various individuals. Most of those submissions expressed the expectation that at least one of the commissioners would be a woman. I am generalising, but I believe that is a reasonable reflection of the women's view. It was also hoped that one of the members of the tribunal would be a woman. Other groups expressing significant interest in the Bill were church groups, almost a dozen social services groups, the Social Workers Association, Halfway House, the Presbyterian Social Service Association, and others. Organisations such as the Intellectually Handicapped Children's Society made representations that the Bill did not provide for their needs. I considered that each submission had considerable validity. These organisations pointed out areas of human rights that were omitted from the Bill, and I hope I shall have time to refer to them. The disadvantaged groups that presented submissions—the Specific Learning Difficulties groups, the Intellectually Handicapped Society, those concerned with the aged, and medical professionals—will not be satisfied with the reported-back version of the Bill, because matters of special concern to them are not specifically covered. Others who made submissions were the civil libertarians from throughout New Zealand, the United Nations, and the Polynesian groups, whose representatives were very articulate—the New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Women's Welfare League, the Pacific Island councils, and the Samoan Council. Submissions were also presented by Amnesty Aroha, the Race Relations Conciliator relating to his role, and ACORD. I mention those groups specifically because of their assertion that their needs have not been explicitly met in the Bill. For instance, the Intellectually Handicapped Children's Society argued for the inclusion of clauses protecting the right of the mentally retarded not only to proper medical and physical care, but also to such education, training, rehabilitation, and guidance as would better enable them to develop their abilities to the fullest possible extent, on the ground that every New Zealand citizen is entitled to the opportunity to achieve the most complete physical, mental, and emotional development possible, irrespective of age, race, sex, or religion. This was one of the groups that sought to change the name of the Bill if the appeal made in their submissions was not met. The group's representatives suggested that the Bill should more appropriately be entitled the “Equal Opportunity Bill”, as many aspects of human rights are not dealt with in the Bill. The group representing those with specific learning difficulties also made particularly appealing submissions, pointing out that it was only reasonable that they should be able to present their concern for the human rights of their members to the proposed Human Rights Commission because the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child was specifically concerned with their group. They felt we should be also. SpeLD (New Zealand) Incorporated was therefore deeply concerned about the narrow limitations of the Bill as presented, pointing out that no specific provision is made to allow the access of interested parties to the commission. I must observe that the rights of the child as laid down in the United Nations declaration are not adequately met in the Bill. In that declaration it is stated that the child who is mentally, physically, or educationally handicapped should receive the special treatment or care required by his particular condition. SpeLD proposed that a general clause be inserted in the Bill to the effect that where the New Zealand Government is a party to any international instrument in human rights, the commission be required to hear submissions from interested parties. With this I must agree. The committee members were careful to enable the commission to establish its own working reference, and I certainly hope that it will be able to encompass these requirements, although they are not specifically recognised in the amended Bill being reported back.

Mr SPEAKER: I am sorry to interrupt the honourable member, but her time has expired.

Mr W. R. AUSTIN (Awarua): During my speech when I seconded the Address in Reply I said that I wanted to talk about social legislation, particularly as it applied to the protection of the individual. I was referring, of course, to the introduction of the Human Rights Commission Bill. It is interesting to look back at the National Party's policy statement, where reference is made to an unease at the expansion of governmental and administrative power that became apparent during the term of the socialist Labour Government, between 1973 and 1975. I believe it was as a consequence of that growing concern that the National Party's policy was devised to introduce this type of legislation. The Bill will help to prevent the expansion of governmental and administrative power, and will place a new emphasis and focus new attention on the rights of the individual. Of course, there is nothing new about this. The National Government has a long history of promoting legislation to protect the rights of the individual, particularly during the past 15 years. During that time it has introduced legislation setting up the office of Ombudsman, and the Race Relations Conciliator. Further progressive legislation protecting women's rights has been introduced by our present Minister of Justice. This legislation was designed to focus attention on and to provide a legislative answer in outlawing discrimination, but it was also aimed at promoting the advancement of human rights, in general sympathy with the principles of the United Nations and international covenants and other overseas legislation enacted in the same field. I believe the Bill provides for the proper formation of a Human Rights Commission whose function will be to promote respect for individual people, irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed. It offers hope for a great number of people who in the past have felt that they, as individuals, have suffered from discrimination. This forward, far-reaching type of legislation will have an impact on our future social life. In the first instance, it is designed to set up a commission to look at the woes, worries, concerns, and complaints of individuals; to offer a charter of hope to those without great private means; to offer hope to those people who are timid and who in the past would not have exposed their individual affairs to such scrutiny; and it charges the tribunal with the very delicate but important job of always trying to reach conciliation between the aggrieved party and the other parties involved in their claims. This really is the key, and is certainly the paramount purpose of the tribunal—to conciliate between the parties-because the area involves very human issues which cannot always be properly measured scientifically. This legislation deals with the emotions, thoughts, and aspirations of individuals, and surely conciliation should be not only the answer to many problems but also a guide for the future, giving the direction to be followed by those interested in the same area. Following on from the establishment of the commission, the Bill proposes the establishment of a tribunal to deal with those difficult cases where agreement cannot be reached through conciliation. The functions of the tribunal will play an important part in instilling confidence in the people, who would soon lose faith in a tribunal or a commission without teeth. It might be said that the tribunal is the instrument through which people will see that justice is being done. I very much enjoyed working on this select committee. This is the first real piece of legislation I have personally been involved in on a select committee, and it is good to see it coming to fruition. I was impressed with the variety and the large number of sources from which submissions came to the committee. They were not just from protesting, busybody groups or eager legal beagles, religious quarters or disenchanted racial groups. They came from individuals and groups representing every section of the community, and this wide cross-section that gave evidence indicates the general interest in the Bill, and the recognition of its importance as a major part in all future social legislation. It is pertinent to comment on the harmonious composition of the committee. It was a pleasure to work with members of the Opposition alongside my own party colleagues. The information drawn from many sources has added greatly to the changes, and the nature of those changes, made to the Bill. Each member on the select committee made an important contribution to its findings. We were, of course, well served by officers from various Government departments and of this House, who were there to advise the committee. The work proved to be a worth-while experience, and I look forward to the passing of this Bill through all stages. I personally compliment the chairman of the committee, who steered us wisely and well, and I also pay tribute to the Minister of Justice, who had the forethought to institute the original Bill. In time it will lead to further social legislation of which New Zealand can be proud. It takes its place properly alongside the legislation of those nations who have embraced the spirit of race relations in the best sense.

Mr LANGE (Mangere): As a member of the select committee for some period, I echo the words of previous speakers as to the pleasure of serving on the committee. It was, of course, my first such experience, and it was satisfying to work with members from both sides of the House and to feel, except in matters of policy which were ultimately determined, that any member on the committee had an opportunity to make a valid contribution and, in some cases, of being able to point to specific matters and having amendments adopted. It certainly gave me an early introduction to the worth of being a parliamentarian, because it was possible on that committee to feel as though something positive was being done. I reflect with interest on the submissions made while I was sitting on the committee. It seemed as though those right-wing groups making submissions saw something of the challenge which is at the root of legislation on individual rights, because those who were professedly ultra-right—and I do not suggest they had any connection with the Government—were quick to say that any protection against discrimination meant that we were placing a fetter on those who would wish to have the licence to discriminate, and to pick and choose, on the basis of prejudice or bias. They were forthright, but they did us a duty, because they showed exactly what we are doing when we venture into legislation on human rights. I confess I do not share the confidence of the member for Awarua, who described this Bill as a charter of hope, because the response to the balances which must be examined in legislating for rights, as set out in this measure, is cautious—a testing of the water in specific areas of human rights, instead of going to the issue of whether we, as a Parliament, will stop people overtly displaying prejudice or bias. This legislation ventures into stopping that bias being demonstrated when it comes to matters of employment and the access to goods and services. Tests or targets of bias are limited to such matters as religion, ethical belief, race, and marital status. When this House eventually accepts the challenge of determining what human rights consist of, there will be a lot of other criteria. Where in this legislation is there a charter of a hope for children, for the disabled, or for the aged? Where is there a charter of hope for those people who hold a variety of political opinions but who are not urban guerrillas, and yet who by this legislation can well be discriminated against? The challenge now is to get much further into an understanding of what we are seeking to protect, and then, as parliamentarians, to determine whether we will take up the challenge of proscribing the right of people to be obnoxious, because it is only in this legislation that the fringes of this type of prejudice are touched. I accept and welcome those provisions which allow for positive discrimination to be exercised where to do so would enable a particular group to achieve some measure of equality or not to be put down, but it is inconsistent with some of the views which are expressed from time to time. I do not regard positive discrimination as showing favouritism or bias to any minority, ethnic, or other group. I look forward to positive discrimination being implemented by this commission. I am pleased that during the hearings of the committee the question of penalties was grappled with. As the Bill started out the penalties were paltry, but they have now soared to the level of penalties allowed in a magistrate's court, on a matter of human rights. From a resumé of the legislation I am pleased to see that there might possibly even be the power for the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court to venture into so critical an area, and to have a measure of control in the awarding of what will approximate to damages. During the hearings submissions were given which sought assurances on the access which people would have to the commission, assurances which still have not been forthcoming either in an amendment or by a statement from those who are to guide it through the House. I am sure that many people who presented the submissions are concerned about what access they would have, and would be assured if a statement was made that New Zealand people will have access to remedies available under this legislation. I mention that this is a cautious first step. The Bill as amended provides that until 1982 an employer may discriminate on the grounds of sex where there are no separate sanitary facilities. I should have thought that, in a matter which required the intervention of the Legislature in something as fundamental to the National Party as this legislation has been stated to be, 5 years might seem a sufficiently generous time to allow someone to procure another lavatory. Is this House really going to stand back and allow discrimination on the grounds of sex to persist for 5 years on such a puny matter as this? I hope that in later sittings the House will do something about amending this. I now want to deal with two provisions in the Bill which are quite inadequate and out of keeping. The first is clause 58 which deals with privacy. We cannot pretend that this is any acceptable subsitute for the privacy legislation which has been promised. It has no teeth; it is a matter of recommendation, and gives no relief to any individual person and does nothing to enhance privacy. I turn as well to clause 59, which begins Part VI. This clause is so different from anything which goes before that one wonders how it was conceived in the same thought. The clause allows a dissident person who believes that there has been some form of victimisation or wrongful inducement to go to the commission, which may thereafter, if conciliation cannot be effected, refer the matter to the Industrial Court. I suggest that the provisions of clause 59 are there because of political policy which is completely unrelated to human rights. In fact, all those matters in clause 59 are covered by the existing criminal law. Quite simply, what is proposed here is to invite people to engage in a procedure which will result in conciliation and in reference to the Industrial Court when what has been complained of is extortion, which is covered in the Crimes Act and punishable by 14 years' imprisonment. What an extraordinary turn of events! If, in fact, by the offer of violence, someone is induced to carry out a different course of conduct, then that is simply extortion. If the argument being advanced is that people who are being threatened are more likely to have recourse to the commission than to the police, then I invite the House to consider what protection the commission is able to afford, day and night, that the police cannot. I consider Part VI quite misconceived. We support this first step into considering how Parliament can protect human rights.

Mr LATTER (Marlborough): I look forward to the verbal fights and debates with members of the Opposition on the points raised by the member for Mangere, but this is not the time to debate the clauses of the Bill, lavatories, privacy, or industrial relations. We still have a second reading debate and the Committee stage. The ground has been well covered а by the chairman of the committee, by the Minister of Justice, and by the member for Henderson. I simply want to content myself with one or two private observations. I make them on purpose because I know that many people of whichever party have wondered what this legislation is about and, to use their own expression, how they can wear it. It is not my type of legislation. The expression “trendy lefties” is used a lot, as is the expression “trendy lawyers”, particularly by members on this side of the House. I am neither. I suppose I am a stodgy righty, and this is the last type of legislation I would have expected to find myself supporting or working for. It was with some surprise that I found myself on the select committee. Probably a very clever person put me there for exactly that reason, so that the committee could have a stodgy righty among the trendy lefties. In looking at the legislation I consider first that it is inevitable, second that such legislation is world wide, and third, we cannot stand back in New Zealand and not move towards this legislation. That is right against my own point of view, because I should like to see a declaration of human rights hanging on the wall of every office and in every employer's and employees' work room, in the hope that New Zealanders would say, “This is the way we mean to go, and let us keep to that”. But we are not going that way, and we cannot avoid this type of legislation. Therefore, I went on the select committee with three aims: first, to be consistent and to make sure that the legislation we brought back was consistent; second, to make sure it was workable; and, third, to make sure it was acceptable to New Zealanders, whichever party they support. I belleve that after 33 meetings and 671 hours of hard work, with 127 submissions studied by the committee even if they were not all heard, and after 22 hours of deliberation, it can be said that the special select committee tried extremely hard. It certainly listened to people and certainly cannot be accused of not having heard submissions from all over New Zealand. I thank the chairman, who did a magnificent job, and also thank the advisers and the committee clerk. The member for Henderson, quite lightly and facetiously, wondered if gratitude would be shown for the contribution made by Opposition members on the committee. I express my gratitude now. I am sure that while I am in the House I will clash often with the member for New Lynn, but the contribution he made was of a very high, consistent, and intensive nature. I also believe the contributions made by the member for Henderson and the member for Mangere were essential, as were the contributions made by the lawyers on this side. It was a very happy committee. Many submissions were made asking the committee to widen the provisions of the Bill so that there would be no discrimination on the grounds of age, mental or physical handicap, or sexual orientation. I believe discrimination on sexual grounds does occur, but should not be introduced into this legislation. I am satisfied that the Bill reported back is in a workable form. As we look at the future, we should also look at this legislation. It revolves around the ability of the commission and the ability of the tribunal, and particularly the panel from which they are selected and I wish the Minister of Justice well on this aspect-and, most important, the interest of Parliament. Reports should not be laid on the table and regarded as just another report, but should be looked at and studied in regard to trends, and what the commission is saying. Part V, on privacy, comes in at this point, because Part V allows the commission to study and recommend. The form in which the Bill goes out to the public is a matter for Parliament, but having served on the special select committee I believe it has been given the study it deserves; and in these days of accusations of “closed government”-a statement I do not have much time for—the committee has heard the public, has listened to what was said, has deliberated, and has brought back a good piece of legislation.

Mrs BATCHELOR (Avon): When I was appointed a member of the committee to look at the Bill, I was delighted to think that I would have the opportunity to have a say on what I considered to be important legislation. I am sorry to say that I do not feel that same excitement now, and I am sorry that the committee did not achieve more. I do not mean to imply any criticism of any member of the committee, because everybody worked well, the committee was extremely well chaired, and everyone did his best to produce forwardlooking legislation. However, we somehow got bogged down, either in legalities or on points on which we could not agree. The member for Henderson made a good point when he suggested that the Bill is not well named. I do not believe it is really a human rights Bill, because it excludes too many groups and shows quite clearly that there is a need for separate legislation covering the rights of the child, the handicapped, and the mentally retarded. None of those is mentioned in the Bill, and, therefore, it would seem to fail. With this in mind, it would seem that the name of the Bill should be changed more in line with the areas with which it is concerned. I agreed entirely with the principles behind the original Bill, but I am disappointed with the way it has been reported back. If one particular group is left open to discrimination or victimisation then the Bill has not lived up to its expectations. To leave out a group because we do not approve of its life style makes the Bill suspect, and a vehicle for intolerance rather than a statement of human rights. People living in de facto relationships have been excluded, which would seem to indicate that such people have no claim under the Bill. It is not my intention at this stage to go through the various clauses of the Bill, although there are some clauses about which I do not know whether to be amused or annoyed. I refer particularly to the clause that spells out occupations such as carpenter, engineer, telephonist, seaman, or typist. One can envisage a female carpenter or engineer, or a male typist or telephonist. I cannot understand the necessity for including the word “seaman”, because, if a woman chooses the sea as a career, will she be known as a seaman? The word "person" does not seem to be acceptable, but it is equally unacceptable to write into a human rights document the term “seaman” or any other term that denotes so obviously one's sex. This appears to negate the principle of treatment according to ability rather than sex—which is what I thought the Bill was all about. Again I do not know whether to be amused or annoyed at the amount of time spent by the committee on discussing the clause that could be seen as barring such organisations as women's bowling clubs or men's cricket teams. The committee seemed to be more concerned about the continuation of such groups than the fact that women have not been allowed to compete in horse racing, not because of any lack of ability, but because of personal prejudice on the part of some policy makers. I cannot help feeling that we have failed to get our priorities right, and until we do the whole question of human rights will remain static. Part VI refers to trade unions, a subject that deserves longer than the 10 minutes allowed on the reporting back. More time is needed to explain fully the reasons this clause was not accepted by some committee members. The member for Henderson said that intolerance could not be legislated out of people, but surely we must try to take action against blind intolerance. Parliament has a responsibility to take whatever action is necessary to improve the lot of minority groups who depend on us to legislate fairly, and who expect us to recognise that not all life styles are the same. Many parts of the Bill are a step forward and clarify discrimination against women in employment. If the Bill concentrated on this issue alone it would be good legislation, and perhaps it would have been better to introduce separate legislation to cover the other matters of concern. It is obvious that other legislation is needed to cover the people not covered in the Human Rights Commission Bill. I agree with the member for Mangere that the Bill is a cautious step, and I congratulate the Government on it. I support the legislation on those grounds. I shall elaborate more fully during further stages of the Bill.

Mr HARRISON (Hawke's Bay): I thank members of the committee for taking part in the debate. It has been very interesting, and I should like to comment on one or two matters. The member for Henderson drew the attention of the House to the new drafting technique, and he gave the example in clause 14 whereby the process is used to show clearly what is not very easy to explain in the language of the law. It is pertinent to remind ourselves of the great difficulty that the committee had in translating the finer points of its thoughts into legal language, even with the aid of the very competent Parliamentary Counsel, Mr Walter Iles. Reference has been made to the Justice Department, Mrs Lowe, Margaret Nixon, and Beth Bowden from the Clerk's office. Many women's organisations made submissions to the committee, and I hope that when the time comes to appoint the commission and the tribunal the Minister of Justice will give due regard to including women on those two bodies. Several speakers made reference to the less fortunate people in our society, against whom there often has been, and probably will continue to be for some time, some form of discrimination—the intellectually handicapped, the physically handicapped, children, and the aged. We all deplore discrimination against these people on any ground, whether in employment, accommodation, or just ordinary life. The committee considered very carefully whether these groups should have been added to the list of people against whom discrimination will no longer be permitted by law, but it decided that the list was long enough as it was, and that it was better to proceed slowly and thoroughly, rather than to overburden the commission initially with more than it was able to cope with. The member for Avon gave her reaction to much of the detail of the Bill. When first looking at the Bill one sees “human rights”, and we all know what they are, but when one starts analysing human rights it is not easy to put the definition down in a few words. The United Nations tried to do that several years ago, and I think there have been two conventions since then when the original concept of human rights has been substantially amended. At one stage it was suggested that the United Nations declaration should be included as a schedule to the Bill, but the original declaration would have been inappropriate because it has been amended, and the conventions would take many pages of presumably legal jargon, which not many people would understand. It is simple to say that one should not discriminate against a person because of his race, ethnic origin, or colour, and to say that that is dealt with under the Race Relations Act. It is also simple to say that one should not discriminate against a person because of his or her religion, or religious or ethical belief, or sex or marital status, and that we are all equal and should be treated accordingly. However, we then come to the fine print and recognise that we quite happily accept differences in some areas. Earlier I mentioned the ladies golf club. Perhaps I should now mention the men's hurdles. They are quite legitimate exercises performed at the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games, and on various sports fields. Much of the time of the committee was devoted, necessarily, to drawing the line between what was a reasonable differentiation between people, and what was unreasonable discrimination. The committee had to define the fine line between protecting the rights of people and their being able to behave differently, and at the same time to protect people from unreasonable, unreasoning discrimination. Therein lay the committee's difficulties. What we have seen in the Bill may be expressed in the words of Isaiah: “The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock, and the dust shall be the serpent's meat; they shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord.” I do not know whether we will reach as far as that, because that is the idea of Utopia, if not Eden.

Hon. Dr A. M. Finlay: I assure the member I will not eat straw.

Mr HARRISON: I am sure the House Committee will see that the member for Henderson does not have to eat straw unless he wishes to.

Motion agreed to.